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29 September 1969

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.  
Assistant for Programs  
National Security Council

**SUBJECT :** North Vietnam Target Inventory

1. In response to the request you levied during the course of our conversation on Friday, 26 September, attached is an inventory of major physical facilities in North Vietnam that could be viewed as potential targets. As you know, this inventory was prepared on short notice and the number of people working on it was held to an absolute minimum for security reasons. It should, therefore, be viewed as a quick rough cut rather than a finished study.

2. Per your ground rules, we did not address the probable political consequences or reactions of the North Vietnamese or others (e.g., the Soviets, Chinese, Western Europeans, South Vietnamese, other Asians, etc.) of attacks on any or all of these targets, though in some instances the near certainty of strong international reactions to attacks on certain targets is alluded to.

3. In the concluding paragraphs of the attached memorandum we do attempt a brief and summary analysis of the impact a loss of the inventoried facilities would have on North Vietnam. The key judgment here is a judgment derived from the analytic review of all available evidence undertaken in the course of preparing this paper and buttressed by our continuing analysis of evidence developed over the course of the years since 1965: namely that even destruction of all these facilities would not make it physically impossible for North Vietnam to continue the war. Thus, physical constraints would not foreclose Hanoi's options by necessarily dictate Hanoi's political response to such attacks.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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